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SECTION 482 AND THE WHITE PAPER

A. The Arm's Length Pricing Methods

Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code' grants to the
Secretary the authority to allocate gross income, deductions,
credits, or allowances between related parties if in the
or
Secretary's determination, such distribution, apportionment,
allocation is necessary to clearly reflect income.2 In October
1988, the Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service 3
[hereinafter Service] issued "A Study of Intercompany Pricing,"
to examine the current state of transfer pricing, particularly
for intangible property.4
Due to increasing problems in administering transfer pricing
policies for both tangible and intangible property, Congress
amended the provisions of S 482 to deal with the lack of specific

1. 26 U.S.C. S 482 (1986). unless otherwise noted, all code references are
to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
2. Id.
3. U.S. TREAsuRn DEAPAmT, A STm iN INmcompAw PRicING (1988) (hereinafter WsiT PAPER].

4. Id. at 1.
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guidelines available for pricing high profit intangibles.,
These particular types of intangibles are described in the White
Paper as products which generate profits far beyond the normal
returns found in the industry.6
In 1968, regulations were promulgated under § 482. These
regulations apply an arm's length standard as the basis for
transfer pricing.7 These regulations provide methods to
determine transfer prices between related parties for loans or
advances, the performance of services, the sale or licensing of
intangible property, and for the sale of tangible property.8
Intercompany pricing rules for the sale of tangible property
include the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.

The comparable uncontrolled price method'
The resale method 0
The cost plus method11
Other unspecified methods.12

Though a description of each of these methods is beyond the
scope of this Comment, it is noteworthy that these methods
attempt to determine an arm's length price for the sale of
tangible property by the use of comparable transfer prices or
transactions. Absent such comparables, the regulations lack any
specific guidance for establishing a transfer price. 3
5. Id. at 45.
6. Id. at 51. The Wurn PAPER does not provide a specific definition for high
profit intangibles, but gives as examples an AIDS vaccine, or a cure for the
common cold. Id. at 51 n.138.
7. Treas. Reg. S 1.482-1 (1991). The regulation articulates that its purpose
is to place a controlled taxpayer on the same level as an uncontrolled taxpayer.
Id. S 1.482-1(b)(1).
8. Treas. Reg. S 1.482-2 (1991).
9. Treas. Reg. S 1.482-2(e)(2) (1991). The Comparable Uncontrolled Pricing
Method was applied in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 996, 1100 (1985),
where the Tax court determined that a transfer price could be determined based
on similar prices established by other manufacturers.
10. Treas. Reg. S 1.482-2(e)(3) (1991). The most noteworthy case involving
the Resale Method was E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United states, 608 F.2d
445 (Ct.Cl. 1979), where the court of Claims rejected the overriding tax
considerations that motivated the petitioner's establishment of their transfer
pricing scheme. This case suggests the danger involved in allocating large
amounts of income to one of the related parties involved in the transaction.
11. Treas. Reg. S 1.482-2(e)(4) (1991).
12. Id. S 1.482-2(e)(1)(iii). The white Paper refers to this method as the
"fourth method." Wazz PAPER, supra note 3, at 11.
13. Wzi' PAPER, supra note 3, at 28. The White Paper concludes that absent

specific comparables, the regulations leave the service and taxpayers with little
guidance. A study by two economists, which revealed administrative problems and
general dissatisfaction with the regulations, lends support to the White Paper's
conclusions, see Gunrther Schindler & David Henderson, Intercorporate Transfer
Pricing, 1985 Survey of Section 482 Audits, TAx Nomzs ToDAY Dec. 1985 at 1171.

In
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Although the White Paper sets forth a general description of
a high profit intangible,1" it is necessary to look to the
Internal Revenue Code for a definition of intangible property.
Such property is defined broadly, and includes a:
1. patent, invention, formula, process, design, pattern,
or knowhow
2. copyright, literary, musical, or artistic composition
3. trademark, tradename, or brand name
4. franchise, license, or contract
5. method, program, system, procedure, campaign, survey,
study, forecast, estimate, customer list, or technical
data
6. similar items. 15
B. Valuation Of Intangible Property

Due to the lack of specific comparables available for
determining transfer prices, valuation problems with respect to
high profit intangible property has ensued. 6 Section 482
adjustments for intangibles were difficult to perform under the
regulations, due to the absence of specific comparables.
Similarly, valuation of tangible property became difficult,
especially where tangible property was transferred to another
party and an intangible was attached. An example of such a
situation is where a transfer of tangible property bearing a
The White Paper
trademark is made to a related party.'
concludes that if no comparable products are identified,
isolating the value of the trademark becomes complex."
The 1968 regulations attempt to determine guidelines for
valuing intercompany transactions" by applying an arm's length
standard for pricing intangible property. The arm's length
standard is the amount which is charged or would be charged in

addition, The white Paper presents seven studies showing the percentage of cases
in which each of the four methods in the regulations were used. Id. at 22. The
1987 survey revealed that the cost Plus method was used in 37% of the cases,
indicating a declining use in the comparable Uncontrolled Price Method. see Id.
This declining use is attributable to the general difficulties
at 28-34.
encountered in finding comparable prices. Id.
14. see supra note 6.
15. I.R.C. 5 936(h)(3)(B) (1986). See also, Treas. Reg. 5 1.482-2(d)(3)

(1991).
16. WHIT PAER, supra note 6, at 12.
17. Id. at 19.
18. Id. at 19-20. The White Paper notes that this situation exists where

royalty rates are set for licensed intangibles.

See also

Eli Lilly & Co. v.

Commissioner, 84 T.C. 996 (1985)(parent manufactured and sold patented products
bearing Darvon label).
19. Wsia PAPER, supra note 3, at 19-20.
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independent transactions with unrelated parties under similar
circumstances.2" When intangible property is transferred, sold,
assigned, loaned, or otherwise made available in any manner by
one member of a controlled group to another member of a
controlled group for other than arm's length, the Service is
empowered under S 482 to make allocations to reflect an arm's
length consideration. 21 This consideration involves:
1.. royalties based on the transferee's output, sales,
profits, or any other measure
2. lump sum payments, or
3. any other form, including reciprocal licensing rights
which might reasonably have been adopted by unrelated
parties under the circumstances.2
The standard applied in determining the amount of the arm's
length consideration is the amount paid by an unrelated party for
the same property under the same circumstances." When similar
transactions involving unrelated parties are unavailable, the
regulations list a dozen factors to be considered in arriving at
an arm's length consideration.2"
II.

THE SUPERROYALTY

PROVISIONS:

THE TAX REFORM ACT OF

1986

A. The Commensurate Standard
The Tax Reform Act of 198625 amended § 482 to provide that
the income from a transfer or license of intangible property
shall be "commensurate with the income" 26 (hereinafter referred
to as "commensurate standard") attributable to the intangible.
The commensurate standard, along with the intangibles listed in §
936(h)(3)(B)of the Code, comprise the "superroyalty" provisions
of the 1986 Act. The White Paper notes that the general goal of
the commensurate standard is to ensure that each party earns the
income or return from the intangible that an unrelated party

20. Treas. Reg. S 1.482-1(d)(3) (1991).
21. Id. S 1.482-2(d).
22. Id. S 1.482-2(d)(2).
23. Id. S 1.482-2(d)(2)(ii).

24. Id. S 1.482-2(d)(2)(iii). For example, the regulations consider the
prevailing rates in the industry, the uniqueness of the property and the time
that it is likely to remain unique, the degree and duration of protection that
is afforded to the property under the laws of the relevant country, the value of
the services rendered by the transferor to the transferee in connection with the
transfer, and the prospective profits to be realized or the costs to be saved by
the transferee either through its use or subsequent transfer of the property. Id.
25. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Section 1231(e)(1), (P.L. 99-514) [hereinafter
1986 Act].
26. I.R.C. S 482 (1986).
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would earn in an arm's length transfer of the intangible.2"
Although the commensurate standard was intended to apply to high
profit intangibles such as those encountered in Eli Lilly,28
this standard will also govern normal profit intangibles. ',
The White Paper specifically rejects the suggestion that the
commensurate standard applies only to high profit intangibles
transferred to low tax jurisdictions.3 0 Since the 1986 Act has
decreased United States corporate tax rates, Congress has become
concerned that the United States may become a "tax haven" for
foreign producers that have a higher marginal tax rate than their
domestic subsidiaries. To counter this problem, the commensurate
standard is applicable to both inbound transfers of intangible
products, as well as to outbound transfers.3
In addition, the
commensurate standard will apply to both manufacturing and
marketing intangibles .32
B. Transfer Pricing and the White Paper

According to the White Paper, application of the
commensurate standard for pricing a transferred intangible
involves determining the income from the intangible, and then
performing an economic analysis of the related party's activities
to determine the economic costs and risks incurred in deriving
the income from the intangible.3 3 Thus, income from the
intangible is the starting point for determining the appropriate
transfer price under S 482, 34 and the White Paper accords it
primary weight. Since past problems have arisen with regard to
finding specific comparables, especially with respect to unique
products, the White Paper refocuses the analysis away from the
often impossible task of finding a true comparable.35
The White Paper suggests the retention of the comparable
27. WHITE PAP ZR, supra note 3, at 17.
28. See supra note 9.
Lilly U.S., pursuant to I.R.C. S351, transferred to
its Puerto Rican subsidiary, Lilly P.R., highly profitable patents of the
pharmaceutical Darvon and Darvon-N.
Congress' concern with this type of
situation was that too much of the consolidated profit of an enterprise from the
sale of high profit intangibles was shifted to foreign affiliates. congress
believed that income from related parties would not be divided fairly to reflect
an arm's length relationship. See STAF OF JOINT COxw. ON TAXATION, 99Tr CoNG., 2D SESS.,
GEERAL EXPLANATION OF TaE TAX REFeoR ACT OF 1986 1014-1015 (Comm. Print 1986).
See also
W21TE PAPER, supra note 3, at 46.
29. Warn PAPR, supra note 3, at 55.
30. Id. at 50.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 46.
33. Id. at 54.
34. Id. at 47.
35. Id.
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uncontrolled pricing method for tangible property.3 6 However, it
bifurcates the arm's length standard as applied to intangible
property into two new methods: (1) exact comparables; and (2)
inexact comparables."'
Exact comparables involve the transfer of a similar
intangible product to an unrelated party that is comparable to
the transfer of the same product between related parties.38 The
White Paper sets fort two tests for determining whether a

transfer involves an exact comparable:
internal standards tests.

(1) the external; and

(2)

The external standards test purports to place the comparable
transaction and the related party in a substantially similar
economic environment as that encountered by an unrelated party
under comparison."
The focus of this test is whether an
unrelated party earns substantially similar profits from a
comparable transaction. In addition, the level of risks assumed
by the related party and the functions performed40 must
be
41
comparable to the unrelated party under comparison.
The internal standards test ensures that the contractual
aspects of the transactions under comparison are similar in all
respects.42 Illustrations contained in the White Paper are the
amounts and forms of compensation for the transferred
intangibles, and the similarity
4 3 of contractual terms where the
transactions involve licenses.
When one or more of the standards for exact comparables
can
44
not be satisfied, inexact comparables should be used.
However, these comparables should not be used solely as the basis
for determining transfer prices, but should be employed when

36. Id. at 27. The White Paper notes that these price3 provide the best
evidence of what unrelated parties would do in an arms length transaction.
However, the priority of the methods articulated in Treas. Reg. S 1.482-2(e)

(1991) for determining the arm's length price for the sale of tangible property
is no longer preferred.

Rather, the White Paper states that the method employed

should be the one where the best data are available, or the fewest adjustments
need be made. Id.
37. Id. at 87.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 88.
40. See Id at 89.
The White Paper notes that it would be improper to
compare a related party transaction that only involves manufacturing activities

to a transaction where the related party performs both manufacturing and
marketing activities.
41. Id. at 88.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 89.
44. Id. at 90.
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exact comparables are unavailable. 45 In addition, use of
inexact comparables is appropriate when the external and internal
standards parallel, as would occur when the inexact comparable
selected is being produced by an unrelated party in the same
economic environment or stage of production."
C. The Arm's Length Method
If both exact or inexact comparables are unavailable, the
White Paper advocates the use of the Basic Arm's Length Return
Method in applying the commensurate standard. The arm's
length method operates to assign market rates of return to
identifiable assets and other factors of production of a
business.48 This differs from using comparables which attempt
to assign market prices to the identified comparables.49 The
first step in using the arm's length method is to perform a
functional analysis of the business by separating each line of
the business into its component activities.5 " Thereafter, the
income attributable to each of the functions can be assigned
according to the market return that would be earned by an
unrelated party performing the same function. 51 The returns that
are attributable to the various components of the business 52 can
be determined by analyzing the rates of return used in similar
activities having comparable risks. Once the returns are
identified for all of the affiliate's functions, then any
residual income is deemed attributable to the intangible assets.
Alternately, it is acceptable to measure the relationship between
income and costs to allocate income when assets are difficult to
measure or where it is difficult to perform an analysis between

45. Id. at 91. (The White Paper notes that this is comparable with the arm's
length standard).
46. Id. The White Paper again notes that the regulations contain twelve
factors for valuing intangibles in the absence of comparables. see supra note 24.
The White Paper states that these factors are essentially internal and external
standards. These factors are accorded some "weighting" by the White Paper, which
were formerly the source of much confusion due to the lack of any priority being
assigned to them. For example, prospective profits that are realized from the
intangible must be given consideration since the commensurate standard is
basically a profits split approach between the related parties. Id. at 92-93.
47. Id. at 102-103 (hereinafter, the Basic Arm's Length Return Method will

be referred to as BALRM].
48. Id. at 95.
49. Id. Assuming that some type of comparable is available, the white Paper
notes that information obtained from it should be given consideration. However,
basing a transfer price solely on information obtained from such a comparable is
inappropriate. Id.
50. Id. at 96.
51. Id.
52. E.g., plant and equipment, and working capital. Id. at 96.
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income and assets. 53 Since the arm's length method relies on
factors of production to perform income allocations,
periodic
4
adjustments to reflect changes are necessary.5
If a multinational corporation has many affiliates that
performs complex functions, bears significant economic risks, and
uses significant self-developed intangibles, the White Paper
states that the arm's length method is inadequate because
comparables and rates of return for the complex functions are
unavailable.55 When the use of the arm's length method is
inappropriate, a profit-split method should be applied.5" Under
this approach, the arm's length method is applied to identifiable
functions of the business that do not involve the use of
significant intangibles.5" Following this functional breakdown,
an arm's length return on assets, or an income-to-cost ratio, can
be determined for each activity of the business and applied to
the appropriate related party factors. The resulting income from
this procedure is then allocated to the party performing the
activity, which in turn leaves a residual net income.58 This
income is then assigned to the related parties by using a
profit-split, based on the relative values of the unique
intangibles employed by the parties." As with the arm's length
method, periodic adjustments are necessary to reflect any changes
that arise in the factors of production."
Thus, if the values
of the assets change, the profit-split percentage must be
adjusted to properly assign the residual income between the
related parties.

53. Id. at 97.

For example, the white Paper suggests using the Berry Ratio.

This approach uses a ratio of gross profit to operating expenses as a viable
method of determining the return on costs. This ratio was used in E.I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 608 F.2d 455 (Ct.Cl. 1979). In E.I. du Pont,
the parent incorporated a swiss subsidiary, du Pont International S.A. (DISA),
which provided marketing support and acted as a distributor of the parent's

products. In upholding the Services reallocation of income between the related
parties, the court relied on an economic analysis provided by Dr. Berry that
indicated that DISA's

gross income to total operating costs, or its

"Berry

Ratio," was comparable to a survey performed by other management firms that were
functionally similar to DISA. see Wu= PAL, supra note 3,at 39-40.
54. Id. at 102.
For example, as an affiliate's sales increase due to
manufacturing breakthroughs or an enhancement to its existing technology, the
resulting income attributable to the production factors must be increased.
55. Id. at 99.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 100.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 101.
60. Id. at 101-102.

HIGH PROFIT INTANGIBLES AFTER THE WHITE PAPER

113

III. THE BAUSCH & LOMB DECISION
The recent case of Bausch & Lomb 1 provides a framework to
illustrate the problems associated with the arm's length return
method. Bausch & Lomb, a New York corporation, manufactures and
sells "soft" contact lenses commercially throughout the United
States. During the 1950's, Dr. Wichterle, a Czechoslovakian
chemist, developed the first soft lenses using a crude spin
casting method. Dr. Wichterle obtained patents for both his
hydrophilic, or water absorbing materials, and the spin casting
techniques. These patents were assigned to the Czechoslovakian
Academy of Science (CAS), where he was employed. In the
mid-1960's, the CAS entered into licensing agreements which
granted Flexible Contact Lens Corporation an exclusive license to
manufacture and sell the soft contact lenses in the Western
Hemisphere. Flexible sublicensed the lens production to National
Patent Development Corporation (NPDC), which in turn granted to
Bausch & Lomb an exclusive sublicense to manufacture, sell, use,
and distribute the Wichterle patents in the Western Hemisphere.
Bausch & Lomb purchased the spin cast machines from NPDC and
invested in improving upon Dr. Wichterle's methods. Employing
both a "spin cast" and "lathing" manufacturing process to produce
the lenses, Bausch & Lomb established its Softlens Division in
1971 for the purpose of manufacturing the contact lenses. From
1979 to 1982, Bausch & Lomb sold the soft contacts in 64
countries, through approximately 23 subsidiaries. Since the
market for soft contact lenses expanded during the 1970's, Bausch
& Lomb soon had different varieties of soft contacts on the
market, which were either developed, or licensed, by Bausch &
Lomb. By improving upon the original spin cast machines, Bausch
& Lomb was able to produce soft contacts for $1.50 per unit while
competitors that used the original lathing method incurred unit
costs of approximately $3.50 per unit.
Bausch & Lomb's New York manufacturing facility was the only
plant that produced and distributed the lenses to foreign market
subsidiaries. Predicting that demand in foreign markets would
increase, Bausch & Lomb investigated the possibility of locating
a contact lens manufacturing facility overseas, and eventually
settled on Ireland for its Softlens manufacturing facility since
the Industrial Development Authority of the Republic of Ireland
(IDA) and the Irish government offered various incentives. These
incentives included a capital grant of 45 percent of the total
investment for the facilities in Waterford, Ireland, low cost
lease financing on 35 percent of Bausch & Lomb's total Irish
investment, costs to cover employee training, and a tax holiday.
61. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. commissioner of Internal Revenue, 92 T.C. 525
(U.S.T.C. 1989).
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On January 1, 1981, Bausch & Lomb entered into an agreement
with its subsidiary Bausch & Lomb Ireland (B&LI), which granted
the latter a nonexclusive license to use certain manufacturing
intangibles in the production of the soft contact lenses. B&LI
was also granted a nonexclusive license to make use of all Bausch
& Lomb owned Irish patents, technical information and know-how
which related to contact lenses, in addition to the materials
used in their manufacture. B&LI was granted the right to use the
name of "Bausch & Lomb" and "Softlens," and agreed to pay Bausch
& Lomb a royalty of 5 percent of net contact lens sales.
B&LI sold 61 percent and 56 percent of their total sales of
the lenses to Bausch & Lomb in 1981 and 1982, respectively. The
transfer price set between the two entities was established at
$7.50 per lens. By 1983, the intercompany price was reduced to
$6.50, to reflect reduced market prices as the competition among
the contact lens producers increased. During 1981 and 1985, B&LI
paid Bausch & Lomb royalties of $418,669 and $1,368,000,
respectively, which represented B&LI's sales of soft contacts
manufactured in Ireland. All manufacturing, processing,
packaging, and other necessary activities to prepare the lenses
for sale to optical practitioners and chains in the United States
were performed in Ireland.
The Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service
(Commissioner) challenged both these payments under § 482 of the
Internal Revenue Code, and the pricing agreement between the
parties. As a result, the Commissioner increased Bausch & Lomb's
taxable income for 1981 and 1982, which resulted, as the
Commissioner contended, from a lack of an arm's length pricing
agreement between the related parties.
Procedurally, the Tax Court focused on the Commissioner's
contention that the royalty rate and the transfer price should be
addressed together, rather than separately. The Commissioner
argued that Bausch & Lomb would not have structured the
transaction to allow B&LI to produce the lenses for $1.50, and
then have Bausch & Lomb purchase these same lenses from B&LI for
$7.50.11 In essence, the Commissioner contended that B&LI was a
contract manufacturer with guaranteed production, and was
therefore not entitled to a return associated with entities that
normally incur the risk of selling a product on the market.
However, the Tax Court rejected the Commissioner's argument since
a repurchase requirement between the entities that would assure
the sale of the subsidiary's production was lacking. 3 The
court held that B&LI neither had a guarantee that the transfer
price it received for the lenses would remain at $7.50, nor was
it guaranteed importation by Bausch & Lomb of substantial
62. Id. at 583.
63. Id. at 583-584.
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quantities of the lenses if demand fell."' Therefore, the Tax
Court concluded that due to the independent significance of the
transfer price and the royalty rate established by the parties,
each should be separately examined.
The court determined that the comparable uncontrolled
pricing method of regulation 1.482-2(e)(2) (ii) was mandatory in
setting an arm's length price between the parties.6 5 Various
third party transactions introduced by Bausch & Lomb provided
evidence that the prices charged by unrelated producers
represented comparable uncontrolled prices.6" The Court found
these transactions persuasive to prove that the $7.50 per lens
price charged by B&LI was equal to or below the prices charged
for similar lenses in similar uncontrolled sales."7
Next, the Tax Court addressed the issue of the royalty
payments. Bausch & Lomb maintained that the 5 percent royalty
rate charged between the related parties should be based on the
Average Realized Price (ARP) of Bausch & Lomb and its
subsidiaries from the sale of the contacts to third parties.
Bausch & Lomb presented evidence that a 5 percent royalty rate of
the ARP constituted an arm's length consideration for the
licensing agreement during the relevant years under examination.
The Service presented two experts to refute Bausch & Lomb's
royalty rate. The first expert calculated a royalty at $4.50 to
$5.25 per lens. The second expert determined that a royalty
necessary to compensate Bausch & Lomb for the use of the
intangibles by B&LI was between 27 and 33 percent of the average
realized price.68 The Court was not persuaded by Bausch & Lomb's
contention that the third party agreements contained the same or
similar intangible property as contained in the B&LI licensing
agreement. In addition, the court rejected the Service's royalty
rate as too high. Since the court could not find a sufficiently
similar transaction involving an unrelated party on which to rely
as evidence of an arm's length rate, the court chose to construct
its own rate."'

64. Id. at 584.
65. Id. at 589.
66. Id. at 590.
67. Id. at 589-590.

The Tax court determined that one agreement

in

particular, the "Lombart agreement," was closely related to Bausch & Lomb's
agreement with B&LI because it provided for a single price to be charged for
either standard or thin lenses. Lomabart charged $8.50 per lens, but did not
incorporate a charge that Bausch and Lomb was required to pay, such as the $0.62
for freight and customs duties. Therefore, even though the Court reduced the
$8.50 by the $0.62, it held that B&LI's price of $7.50 did not need adjustment
since it was less than the United States competitors' prices.
68. Id. at 596.

69. Id. at 600. See also Treas. Reg. S 1.482-2(d)(2)(iii) (1991).
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To construct a royalty rate, the court determined that
Bausch & Lomb's projections were the best indication of
prospective profits to be anticipated through the use of the spin
cast technology and the capital investment required to generate
these profits. These projections, known as the Special
Expenditure Application (SEA), were originally prepared by Bausch
& Lomb for its Board of Directors to determine the feasibility of
the Irish investment."°
Bausch & Lomb had estimated the capital cost of
constructing the Irish facility at $9,570,000, which included
$2,718,000 of leased assets."' The court noted that the leased
assets could be obtained under favorable lease terms, since the
lessor was entitled to IDA grants of 45 percent of their
$2,718,000 cost. In addition, $1,511,000 of Section 8472
financing would provide working capital and finance start-up
costs. Therefore, the $8,363,000 of capital assets and working
capital would be invested in B&LI."
The SEA contained ten year earnings and cash flow
projections, reflecting Bausch & Lomb's estimate of earnings that
would be generated from B&LI. The court determined that this
report would be a reliable representation of Bausch & Lomb's
expectations of the earnings that a hypothetical investor would
hope to generate at the time it decided to invest in the Irish
facility. A few minor adjustments were made to the report in

70. Id. at 600-601.

The Court cited Treas. Reg. S 1.482-2(d)(2)(iii)(g)

(1991) and noted that they could determine prospective profits in constructing
the royalty rate.
71. Id. at 601.
The acquisition of the non-leased assets were to be
financed as follows:
B&LI Capital stock
B&LI Intercompany Loan
IDA Grant

TOTAL

1980
213,000
5,489,000

5,702,000

1981
(1,933,000)
3,083,000

Total
213,000
3,556,000
3,083,000

1,150,000

6,852,000

Id. at 601.
72. Section 84 financing is part of the Irish Corporation Tax Act of 1976

which allows, in certain instances, Irish banks to receive loan interest tax
free. Thus, Bausch and Lomb was able to receive a favorable interest rate on
their borrowings in order to make loans to B&LI. Approximately $4,200,000 was
borrowed and subsequently loaned to B&LI. Id. at 564.
73 This was arrived at as follows
Capital Assets
Working Capital

$6,852,000
1,511,000

TOTAL

$8,363,000

Id. at 602.
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order to properly reflect market conditions.74 The court noted
that an arm's length royalty would be based on the price that the
licensee was able to realize through the sale of products

produced using the licensed technology."' The court promptly
rejected the Service's rate since it was too high,76 and also

rejected Bausch & Lomb's calculated rate of 12.81 percent for
1981, and 11.01 percent for 1982.
The court focused on their understanding that an investor in
the Irish facility could expect to earn an internal rate of
return of approximately 35 percent, and considered this result
generous in light of the moderate risks to which Bausch & Lomb
was exposed in the investment. 7 The Tax Court held that B&LI

would have been willing.to invest in the facility even if
required to share approximately 50 percent of the profits for use
of the intangibles.78 At trial, an expert testified that a
royalty rate generally divided net profits before royalties
approximately 25 percent to 75 percent between the licensor and
the licensee, respectively. However, since B&LI would have found
itself in a much weaker bargaining position than Bausch & Lomb,
B&LI would have had to cede more of the profits from plant
operations to Bausch & Lomb than the 25 percent, and in fact

would have been willing to invest in the facility even if
required to share 50 percent of the profits."' Therefore, the
Court decided that this result would be achieved by using a 20
percent royalty rate which would generate earnings to cover the

74. For example, the court rejected Bausch & Lomb's assumption that the
$7.50 unit selling price should remain constant over the ten years, and held that
an adjustment must be made in order to reduce the selling price to reflect
increased competition in later years. Id. at 603.
75. The court noted that the price realized by Bausch & Lomb on its resale
of the lenses to non-affiliates did not matter. The fact that the purchaser of
the product who was also the licensor of the technology was irrelevant as long
as the purchaser paid a market price. Id. at 605.
76. The court noted that no independent party would enter into a transaction
for the license of intangibles under circumstances in which the royalty charged
would preclude any reasonable expectation of earning a profit through the use of
the intangibles. Id. at 607.
77. The Internal Rate of Return (IRR) is the interest rate that equates the
present value of the expected future cash flows to the initial cash outlay. The
present value of the cash flows from an investment using an arbitrary interest
rate is computed and then compared to the present value of the investment's cost.
When the present value of the cash flows from the investment equals its cost, the
interest rate used to discount the cash flows is equivalent to the IRR. The Tax
Court determined that Bausch & Lomb's initial investment of $8,363,000 in B&LI
approximated the net present value of future earnings when discounted at 35%.
Id. at 608.
78. This was arrived at as follows: the royalty rate, which was 20% of the
transfer price, divided by the total 10 year projected operating earnings
[$21,874,000/$44,320,000 = .49320 or approximately 50%]. Id. at 525.
79. Thus, the rule of thumb of a 25% - 75% net profits split between the
licensor/licensee was rejected. Id. at 608.
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$8,363,000 investment in the facility by the fourth year of
operations.
This rate translated into an internal rate of
return of 27 percent for B&L in the project. The Court noted
that the 15 percent "premium", which was in addition to the
original 12 percent rate used by B&L, represented compensation
for the assumption of risks Bausch & Lomb incurred in the
venture.
Thus, the royalty rate determined by the Tax Court became in
the court's "best judgment," the rate that would achieve the
desired results over the ten year projected period. Using the 20
percent royalty rate, the court concluded that at arm's length,
Bausch & Lomb would have received royalties from B&LI of
$1,674,000 for 1981 and $5,541,000 for 1982.90 This was
contrasted to Bausch & Lomb's computations based on ARP and a 5
percent royalty rate of $1,072,552 and $3,050,028, respectively,
for those same years.
IV.

THE WHITE PAPER:

A FRAMEwoRx FoR ANALYSIS

A. Bausch & Lomb After the White Paper

The heart of the White Paper is Chapter eleven, which
discusses the arm's length methodology for intangible property
pricing.8" Chapter eleven establishes four methods that the Tax
Court could have applied to the transactions in Bausch & Lomb.
These methods are: (1) Exact Comparables; (2) Inexact
Comparables; (3) the Basic Arm's Length Return Method (BALRM);
and (4) the Basic Arm's Length Return Method Plus a Profit Split.
The White Paper would reject use of the Exact and Inexact
Comparable methods in Bausch & Lomb. Use of the Exact Comparable
Method would require that the transaction being considered
involve the transfer of the same intangible under the same or
similar circumstances."2 However, there were no exact
comparable transactions available for the Tax Court to examine.
The court pointed out that only Bausch & Lomb had been able to
successfully mass produce the soft contacts using the spin cast
technology.83 Thus, there were no other transfers of this

80.

The calculation was based on the following:

1981 - 1,116,000 units sold x $7.50 transfer price x 20% royalty rate =
$1,674,000.
1982 - 3,694,000 units sold x $7.50 x 20% = $5,541,000.

Id. at 607.
81. WHITE PAPER,

supra note 3, at 87.

82. Id.
83. Bausch & Lomb Inc. V. C.I.R.,

92 T.C. 525, 599 (U.S.T.C. 1989).
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technology available for comparison. Similarly, the Inexact
Comparable Method would be inappropriate. This method requires
that the internal and external standards test be met before it
can properly be used. The White Paper states that if the
intangible property in the unrelated party transaction is at a
different stage of development, then it can not be used as a
84
comparable.
The spn cast technology that was licensed to
B&LI was at a different stage of development than the two
licensing agreements that Bausch & Lomb had presented to the
court as similar transactions. Indeed, the court stated that the
spin cast method was the most efficient production process then
in use, and noted that this process enabled Bausch & Lomb to
enjoy significant cost savings over its competitors in the
production of the lenses.85 Therefore, since Bausch & Lomb would
not meet the external standards test, use of inexact comparables
would be unacceptable.
The Basic Arm's Length Return Plus a Profit Split Method can
also be rejected, since the White Paper requires that the
manufacturing affiliate perform complex functions, bear
significant risks, and own significant intangible assets equal to
those of the parent." In addition, the manufacturing affiliate
must possess some type of intangible that has major importance to
the enterprise, and which few unrelated parties possess.8 7 B&LI
did not perform activities that involved an intangible of
significant importance to Bausch & Lomb.
By rejecting the use of the Exact or Inexact Comparable
Methods, the remaining approach that the Tax Court could have
used is the BALRM. While various scholars have already analyzed
the BALRM 8 and hypothesized as to the outcome that the Tax
court could have reached by using this method,89 this paper only
focuses on the problems that arise when the BALRM is applied to
transactions involving high profit intangibles. By isolating
this special group of intangibles, the problems associated with
the arm's length method become apparent. The Bausch & Lomb case
is used for illustrative purposes since the related party
transaction considered by the Tax Court involved a high profit
intangible in the form of soft contact lenses.

PAPz, supra note 3, at 91.
85. Bausch & Lomb, 92 T.C. at 599.
86. WuITzE PAPER, supra note 3, at 99.
87. id.
88. See Philip A. Stoffregen, Et. Al., The BALRH Approach To Transfer
Pricing: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, TAx NoTs, March 6, 1989 at 1257; D.
Kevin Dolan, Intercompany Transfer Pricing For the Layman, TAX NOTEs, October 8,
1990 at 211.
84. WazT

89. See, e.g., Daniel J. Frisch & Thomas Horst, Bausch & Lomb And The white
Paper, 43 TAx NOTES, May 8, 1989 at 735.
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Bausch & Lomb presented two problems for the Tax Court.
First, an arm's length transfer price between Bausch & Lomb and
B&LI for the soft contact lenses had to be determined. Secondly,
the court had to reconstruct an arm's length royalty rate for the
use of the intangibles. However, it must be noted that the
Bausch & Lomb opinion is not reliable for applying White Paper
methodology. The Tax Court, arriving at the 20 percent royalty
rate split between the parties, used their "best judgment" in
determining that at arm's length, B&LI would have been willing to
share in 50 percent of the profits from Bausch & Lomb as
consideration for the use of the intangibles.9" Using "best
judgment" does not present concrete guidance when applying the
section 482 regulations. Furthermore, there is no basis for the
court's determination that the 27 percent internal rate of
return, which was 15 percent higher than Bausch & Lomb's 12
percent rate, was "wholly adequate to compensate Bausch & Lomb
Ireland" for assuming the risks in the related party venture. 91
By arriving at the 20 percent royalty rate, the court
concluded that an investor in the Irish lens facility could
expect an internal rate of return of 35 percent over the life of
the project.92 The 15 percent premium was considered by the
court to be overly generous to B&LI in light of the moderate
risks to which it was exposed. However, it is questionable
whether the 15 percent premium was a correct adjustment in light
of the White Paper's presumption that an affiliate should be
compensated with a return not in excess of the moderate level of
risk expected in order to achieve market acceptance."
90. Bausch & Lomb, 92 T.C. at 611.

91. Id. at 611.
92. Bausch & Lomb, 92 T.C. at 608.

93.

WHITE PAPER,

supra note

3,

at 105.

The affiliates return should reflect only the moderate
level of risk borne by manufacturers of products that
are reasonably likely to achieve market acceptance.
Likewise, if there is uncertainty that the product will
be marketed unsuccessfully, then the marketing risk also
should not be borne by the affiliate but should probably
be shared in some fashion by the owner of the
manufacturing intangible and the marketer, depending
upon the extent to which anticipated profits from the
enterprise are attributable to the manufacturing
intangibles or the marketing activities. Id.
Among other things, the foreign affiliate carries raw
material,
work-in-process,
and
finished
goods
inventories and should receive a normal market return on
its activities that reflects its investments in such
assets and the moderate risk that manufacturers using
routine manufacturing processes bear with respect to
their investment in manufacturing facilities and
inventories. Id. at 95.
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The problem of finding such a rate of return becomes more
readily apparent when high profit intangibles are involved. The
Tax Court concluded that the intangibles encompassed in Bausch &
Lomb's spin cast technology were superior to other available
methods of producing soft contact lenses.94 Bausch & Lomb had
been able to successfully mass produce the lenses using the most
efficient process in current use. While noting that risk was
heightened for a licensee entering the market without any proven
technology, the court concluded that B&LI's risk was moderate, as
compared to other companies that were not using the advanced
technology." Therefore, it appears that the Tax Court applied
a "sliding scale" approach to determine the appropriate risk
premium adjustment that would adequately compensate Bausch & Lomb
for their risk in the project.
Since the White Paper advocates the use of a market rate of
return that is comparable to that of an unrelated party bearing
similar risks, the Tax Court's conclusion regarding the internal
rate of return and the royalty rate is arbitrary under White
Paper standards. Although the Court arrived at a seemingly
calculated internal rate that would allow an investor in B&LI to
recover an initial investment through earnings generated from the
project, there were no comparable licensing agreements that the
court could use to base its decision. Therefore, what the court
deemed adequate in light of the risks assumed, a different
approach to valuing the intangible, or setting the royalty rate
under the arm's length method might yield an entirely different
result. This sliding scale approach creates a continuum of
acceptable rates. The problem of continuum rates is considered
in greater detail in the next section.
As previously noted, the BALRM seeks to identify the assets
and other factors of production used by the related parties in
the line of business, and then assigns market returns to them. 6
The White Paper recognizes that the current S 482 regulations use
a market based approach to income allocation. The White Paper
notes that the goal of the market based approach is to distribute
income in the way that the market would allocate it, and
implements this by determining a separate transfer price for each
Due to the uniqueness of an
individual transaction."
intangible, the White Paper recognizes that differences exist in

94. Bausch & Lomb, 92 T.C. at 599.
95. Id.
96. WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 95.
97. Id. at 79.
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valuing intangible, as opposed to tangible, assets.

8

B. The Market Based Approach Of The White Paper and the
Continuum Price Problem

The White Paper notes that the market based approach has
been attacked by commentators" whose criticisms are aimed at
the use of such an approach between related parties that conduct
transactions within the same entity. The White Paper considers a
situation where a vertically or horizontally integrated
technology is available to a multinational company. If the
multinational is able to produce at a lower price because it owns
a unique production technology, then an arm's length price may be
unavailable. This phenomenon is referred to as the "continuum
00 In a recent article, Professor Stanley
price" problem.'
Langbein describes the continuum pricing problem, and theorizes
that the arm's length standard when applied to an integrated
business is unworkable.' Professor Langbein believes that
whether the reseller/distributor or the producer/seller is
examined, a continuum price arises because the arm's length
standard generates a series of prices, not just a single arm's
length price that is acceptable to either related party. More
importantly, Professor Langbein concludes that neither the
taxpayer nor the Service can determine the appropriate arm's
length price.0 2
The White Paper states that a continuum pricing problem does
not arise in an industry with only one production technology that
is available to both parties, and where there is no difference in
0 3 Since both
costs between the related and unrelated parties.'
the related and unrelated party transactions will have occurred
in the marketplace, the arm's length standard can be applied,
thereby making it possible to observe the prices that the
unrelated party charges.
The opposite of the above situation resembles the Bausch &
Lomb transaction. Bausch & Lomb was an integrated manufacturer
and distributor of soft contact lenses. During the relevant
years that the Tax Court considered, Bausch & Lomb's technology
was predominant in the soft lens industry, and had been improved

98.
Id. at 86.
"These [intangible) assets are often unique and it is
frequently difficult to decide what returns they would earn if separately
employed in the marketplace." Id.
99. WsiT PAzR, supra note 3, at 80.
100. Id. at 82.

101.

See Stanley I. Langbein, Current and Quotable: Langbein Says Arm's

Length Method is unworkable, TAX NotEs, Sept. 3,
102. Id. at 1318.
103. WiTE PAP a, supra note 3, at 82-83.

1990 at 1317.
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to the point where they were able to produce lenses approximately
$2.50 less than competitors. This technological advantage
suggests that since the same technology was not available to both
Bausch & Lomb and its competitors, whereby the competitors could
produce at the same costs as Bausch & Lomb, a continuum pricing
problem results.
As the next section will explore, this continuum pricing
problem frequently arises when high profit intangibles are
involved. The focus of the next section contemplates setting
royalty rates for high profit intangibles in accordance with
White Paper methodology. Since a high profit intangible is
unique, ownership of such an intangible will provide related
parties with a competitive advantage over unrelated parties.
Arguably, it is this advantage that creates the continuum pricing
problem, and renders the arm's length method functionally
inadequate for setting transfer prices for high profit
intangibles.
V.

HIGH PROFIT INTANGIBLES,
LENGTH METHOD:

A.

ROYALTY RATES, AND THE FAILURE OF THE ARM'S
THE CONTINUUM PROBLEM RESURFACES

Transfer Pricing Using Royalty Rates

The White Paper recognizes potential problems with high
profit intangibles, where related party transfer prices are set
in terms of royalty rates. 0 4 This is inapposite to normal
profit intangibles that have comparable third party licensing
agreements. Applying the arm's length method to manufacturers
with high profit intangibles produces different royalty rates
between the related parties. This results from the subjectivity
involved in assigning market returns to transactions between
related parties, and the lack of comparables and the risks
inherent in the transactions.
The White Paper contains an example0 s which is similar to
the transaction encountered by the Tax Court in Bausch & Lomb.
In the example, a U.S. corporation has developed and patented a
new drug that it plans to manufacture through a foreign
manufacturing subsidiary, which will then be returned to the
United States for sale. Some of the drug will be shipped from
the manufacturing subsidiary to a foreign marketing subsidiary
for sale in Europe. The parent structures the transaction so
that it will receive a royalty, and then the parent and the
marketing subsidiary will pay the manufacturing subsidiary for
104. Id. at 51. "(O]wing to the intangible's enormous profitability, an
allocation under the commensurate with income standard, if made solely through
a royalty rate adjustment, might be so large compared to normal product royalty
rates that it does not look like an arms length royalty." Id.
105. WHITz PAPER, supra note 3, app. E.
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the finished product. The White Paper determines that the arm's
length method is proper for the parent since no comparables
exist. After sampling other manufacturers, the parent believes
that an average rate of return on the manufacturing assets is 12
percent. A further sample of other marketers and drug
distributors indicates an earnings of cost plus a 25 percent
markup. Based on these returns, and the income and cost data
provided in the example, a royalty rate of 92 percent is deemed
appropriate. This high royalty rate is questionable, but the
White Paper recognizes that such a "super royalty" rate may be
required with a high profit intangible if one party performs
minor economic contributions.' 6 Although the White Paper may
choose to justify this super royalty rate in terms of an economic
split between the parties, only a theoretical, as opposed to a
concrete framework is provided for determining how related
parties should account for these "economic contributions."
The White Paper states that if one of the parties to a
transaction bears more risks, then more income should be
allocated to that party." 7 This risk allocation should be
based on the true economic activities undertaken by the parties,
and not on mechanisms that merely shift the underlying risks
encountered in the transaction.'08 If the owner of the
intangible has developed a manufacturing process without
significant contributions from an affiliate, as in Bausch & Lomb,
then the owner is entitled to an arm's length return. The
affiliate should be compensated with a return not in excess of
the moderate level of risk that manufacturers of products are
reasonably expected to earn in order to achieve market
acceptance.'"' It is important to recognize that the above
example from the White Paper does not indicate how the risk
factor was arrived at in determining the 92 percent royalty rate,
other than noting that hypothetically, there were other companies
that performed similar marketing and manufacturing functions.
110

The White Paper suggests that a company perform a functional
analysis by segregating its component activities involved in the
business, and then identifying the measurable assets used in
production."' Income is then assigned to these assets by
measuring the rates of returns using unrelated party
transactions."2 The market rates of returns may be determined

106. Id.

107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 104.

111.

Id. at 50.

Id.
Id. at 105.
Id. at app. E.

112. Id.
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by analyzing unrelated parties' returns on components used in
similar functions, which assumes similar economic risks and
comparable returns on the unrelated parties' components. 11
The White Paper states that the rate of return used to
allocate the income between the related parties includes a return
on routine manufacturing intangibles that manufacturers normally
possess, plus a return for assuming the normal risks that
manufacturers bear with respect to their investment in the
1 4
In addition, the rate of
facilities and the inventories.
return should be similar to an unrelated party's rate of return
used in similar functions." 5
The Tax Court in Bausch & Lomb segregated the parent
company's assets and used a ten year cash flow projection to base
their analysis of the related party transactions. Thus, the Tax
Court performed the initial step required by the BALRM. The next
step of the BALRM is to assign income to these assets by
measuring the rates of returns using unrelated party
transactions. Theoretically, a rate of return could be calculated
that would allow a return on manufacturing intangibles, plus a
return for the risks associated with investing in the
manufacturing facilities. Therefore, the different risk
variables that affect the returns of the unrelated parties'
assets must be identified. However, this is extremely difficult
to accomplish because a company manufacturing a high profit
intangible with a unique production technology or advanced
technology is unable to compute a rate equivalent to an unrelated
party with inferior technology. Bausch & Lomb's venture entailed
less risk than other manufacturers had with respect to their
technology for producing contact lenses. This resulted from
Bausch & Lomb's advanced technology and the general demand for
the lenses.1 6 Had the Tax Court accepted one of the licensing
agreements that Bausch & Lomb presented as a comparable
transaction, it is still questionable whether the Court would
have been able to determine whether one of the unrelated party

113. Id.
114. Id. at 97.

115. Id. at 96-97.
116. The Tax Court stated:

we

thus

conclude

that

the

intangible

property

encompassed in B&L's spin cast technology was superior
to that existing on January 1, 1981, with respect to
either the cast molding process or the vertical spin
cast process. Neither of these technologies had

successfully been shown to be commercially feasible over
an extended period of time as had the B&L spin cast
technology. Bausch and Lomb Inc. v. C.I.R., 92 T.C. 525,
599 (U.S.T.C. 1989).
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agreements entailed the same risks as Bausch & Lomb had assumed
with B&LI.
B. The Failure Of The Market Based Approach

The market based approach seeks to assign a rate of return
that assumes similar risks between related and unrelated parties.
In capital budgeting, the internal rate of return is the rate
that equates the present value of an investment's inflows with
its outflows. The rate of return the investor seeks in
evaluating an investment is called the "hurdle" rate, or the
minimum rate that must be earned for a project to be accepted.
Estimating cash flows can become difficult. When a firm employs
capital, it receives cash flows from the capital, which in
reality will vary. Two factors that produce these uneven flows
are the firm's competitive position in the market, and the
existing state of the economy. The rate of return also
encompasses investments risks. The greater the risk of an
investment, the greater the expected return. In determining the
appropriate risk adjusted discount rate to evaluate an investment
project, analysts frequently adjust this rate to take into
account the differences in risks.
The White Paper uses a market rate of return to evaluate a
company with a high profit intangible. However, this rate is the
average rate of return for similar technologies. For high profit
intangibles, this average rate must be used since these
intangibles will not have comparable technologies in order to
make unrelated party comparisons.
However, in capital budgeting
the hurdle rate used is industry specific, and takes into account
the risks and the market conditions that affect the rate that a
firm will employ to measure projects. The problem with using an
average rate to allocate income is that it will not effectively
measure the risks inherent in a project. The average rate of
return will require some "risk premium" to be added in order to
account for the risks that a company will incur in undertaking a
project. In other words, the White Paper recognizes that an
industry specific rate of return for two companies can not be
ascertained, and therefore uses an average rate of return with
the requirement that a risk premium be added to adjust for the
risks undertaken in a project.1" For example, the Tax Court
tried to accomplish this by adding a risk premium to the 12
percent rate of return that Bausch & Lomb had arrived at through
the ten year SEA projections.
This risk premium adjustment contributes to the continuum
pricing problem because it creates a range of acceptable rates.

117. Example 7 in appendix E arrives at the hypothetical rate of return of
12% by using an average rate of return on manufacturing assets. Wszz PAPER, supra
note 3, app. E at 8.
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Any rate that is acceptable within a given range will be
considered an.arm's length rate. For example, consider a company
that has a high profit intangible. Using the arm's length
method, the company derives a 20 percent "comparable" rate of
return from an unrelated party's assets, which translates into a
10 percent royalty rate. However, based on White Paper theory,
this assumes that the 20 percent rate of return is an average
rate of return. Suppose that the company adds a 5 percent risk
premium since they are using high-tech equipment that is
previously untested. With a 25 percent rate of return, the
company computes a 15 percent royalty rate. Theoretically, any
rate between the 10 percent and 15 percent royalty rate is
arguably at arm's length. Thus, a continuum of acceptable
royalty rates is created.
Other commentators, using Bausch & Lomb data, have also
presented alternate approaches to the arm's length method that
would be acceptable under White Paper theory. Although these
commentators do not analyze the White Paper's shortcomings by
focusing on the theoretical problems underlying the market based
approach, their conclusions are illustrative of the fact that a
series of acceptable rates can be calculated using the arm's
length methods'18
One particular commentator recognized that a market based
approach rarely quantifies the specifics inherent in individual
licensing agreements.11 9 In a hypothetical the author used
simple capital budgeting techniques and evaluated the component
assets used by Bausch & Lomb by the weighted average cost of
capital (WACOC) and discounted cash flows technique. By using
the WACOC, the author was able to incorporate both systematic and
unsystematic risks in arriving at an average rate of return of 12
percent that-he noted would have been reasonable for the Tax
Court to employ. 120 Consequently, the author determined that a
12 percent royalty rate was appropriate, and the 20 percent rate
used by the Tax Court was extreme.
Frisch & Horst 121 used a different approach to the Bausch &
Lomb facts. They noted that the return on a project such as
Bausch & Lomb's involved an internal rate of return, which when
applied to discounted cash flows, resulted in a present value
that equated the cash flows to the initial capital outlay of the
investment. Although they accepted the 27 percent rate arrived
at by the Court, they made various adjustments to B&LI's
estimated cash flows. Frisch & Horst arrived at a 34 percent

118. Cf. Langbein, supra note 101.
119. see Lawrence P. shanda, Taxes,
120. Id. at 581.
121. See supra note 89.

Tnm TAx MAGAziN,

September, 1989 at 576.
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royalty rate, which they believe correctly reflected any changes
in the original ten year projection determined by Bausch & Lomb,
and which the Tax Court used to base its royalty rate
calculation.122
VI. CONCLUSION

This Comment focused on the problems associated with the
arm's length method when applied to high profit intangibles.
Since the White Paper fails to provide specific guidance when
related parties seek to determine royalty rates, establishing a
true arm's length rate becomes extremely difficult, especially
when a high profit intangible is involved.
The Tax Court's
holding in Bausch & Lomb, particularly as it dealt with royalty
rates, was used as an illustration of the many problems that
would occur if White Paper methodology had been used to calculate
an arm's length rate.
Determining a royalty rate under the White Paper involves
segregating the various components of the business used in
production, and assigning market rates of return to the
components. The White Paper requires that the rate of return
used to allocate income between the related parties involve
similar economic activities with similar economic risks of the
unrelated party under comparison. However, determining this rate
of return is what creates a continuum pricing problem. This
arises because under the arm's length method, the White Paper
uses an average rate of return for a high profit intangible, but
requires a risk premium adjustment to compensate a party for the
risks involved in the transfer. Since a high profit intangible
normally does not have a related party transaction for
comparison, it becomes difficult to estimate the true risks
incurred by the unrelated party. Therefore, the risk adjustment
becomes arbitrary, with the result that many, theoretically
correct arm's length royalty rates are established.
Two alternate approaches by commentators have been presented
to illustrate that other technically correct methods can be
employed to calculate arm's length royalty rates. As compared to
the Tax Court's calculations, one commentator believed that a 12
percent royalty rate would have been appropriate, while the other
determined that a 34 percent rate was correct. These different
royalty rates reiterate the hypothesis that the arm's length
method will generate a series of royalty rates for high profit
intangibles.
Thus, while the White Paper attempts to provide a method for
establishing a true arm's length transfer price between related
122. Id.
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parties, the arm's length method may produce nothing more than a
"best judgment." Ironically, the White Paper notes that where no
comparables exist, the regulations leave the Service and more
importantly the taxpayers, with no guidance. While the White
Paper is an admirable examination of the theory and
administration of transfer pricing, it serves little more than to
foster more uncertainty in these already troubled waters.
Robert J. Birch

